Volume: 23, Issue: 2 - 02/03/2025
Many successful claimants under federal contracts are entitled to attorney fees and other litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. However, the government will not be liable for fees and expenses if its original denial of the claim is “substantially justified.” Does this refer to the government’s overall response to a consolidated claim or just the portion of the claim upon which the contractor prevailed on appeal? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently ruled on this issue.
The Federal Circuit said the statute, as amended, requires examination of the overall administrative record. However, it is appropriate—and standard practice—to focus on the successful portion of the contractor’s appeal. The government’s conduct and reasoning in denying that portion of the claim is crucial.
The second case in this issue involves a contractor’s adoption of a subcontractor proposal as a term of the subcontract agreement. Language in that proposal created an unexpected problem for the contractor regarding its Commercial General Liability insurance coverage.
The third case addresses the proper way to appeal denial of a claim on a federal contract. The appeal must allege facts and make arguments consistent with the claim initially submitted to the government contracting officer. Otherwise, the contractor has essentially skipped that step of the claim process, and the appellate board has no jurisdiction.
In analyzing a contractor application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a tribunal must judge the government’s “substantial justification” in the context of the entirety of the administrative record. It is proper, however, to focus on the portion of the claim upon which the contractor prevailed.
By converting a subcontractor proposal into a subcontract agreement, a prime contractor agreed to language contrary to the requirements of the contractor’s Commercial General Liability insurance policy. There was no coverage for property damage caused by the subcontractor’s work.
A contractor’s claim to the government contracting officer alleged a negligent construction cost estimate, but the appeal of denial of the claim alleged a constructive change in the scope of work. This created a jurisdictional problem.
Volume: 22, Issue: 24 - 01/15/2025
Substantial completion is a crucial milestone in the course of a construction project. Recognition that a project can be occupied and used for its intended purpose carries significant contractual and financial ramifications. The two cases in this issue involve the responsibility for a necessary element of the work and a contract definition of substantial completion.
A subcontractor argued it had not been responsible for work that was required for timely occupancy of a public school project. The Wyoming Supreme Court refused to accept the sub’s interpretation of a drawing note, saying it was contrary to common use and understanding of the language.
In today's second case, a project's contract documents required a certificate of occupancy from a public agency, using an acronym to identify the agency. Unfortunately, the acronym could be used as shorthand for two separate agencies, one municipal and one state. Fortunately, a separate section of the documents clarified the matter.
A contract requirement for prior approval by a third party did not shift responsibility for the actual performance of the approved work. Additionally, a directive attempting to cure a breach of contract was not a change in the contract requirements.
A request for proposals defined substantial completion using an acronym identifying two different agencies, one state and one municipal. The “definitions” section of the solicitation resolved the ambiguity.
Volume: 22, Issue: 23 - 12/16/2024
Active interference, as opposed to mere hindrance, is a well-recognized exception to the enforceability of no-damages-for-delay clauses. However, it is a distinction that defies a bright line demarcation. A federal appeals court recently grappled with this distinction and came up with an unusual result.
A prime contractor’s failure to provide compacted earth temporary work stations in accordance with the terms of a subcontract constituted active interference with the subcontractor’s work. The muddy conditions prevented the subcontractor’s performance and necessitated the purchase of mats. The high labor costs incurred in moving the mats from work station to station, however, resulted from a mere hindrance.
The second case in this issue involves liquidated damages for late completion. Although the contractor was not responsible for the majority of the late completion time, the project owner did not lose the right to assess liquidated damages for the remainder of the late completion period. Responsibility for the delay could be apportioned.
The third case addresses a state transportation authority’s change in standard specifications affecting bid bonds and bid responsiveness. The new spec could not be applied to bids submitted prior to the effective date of the revision.
Active interference, as opposed to mere hindrance, is a well-recognized exception to the enforceability of no-damages-for-delay clauses. A federal appeals court, applying Florida law, produced an unusual result when distinguishing the two actions.
Although a contractor was not responsible for the majority of the delay resulting in late completion of the project, the owner could still enforce the liquidated damages clause against the contractor—but only for the portion of the delay that was neither excusable nor compensable.